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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
WILLS-REVOCATION BY OPERATION OF LAw-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGE-RETROACTIVITY OF STATUTES GOVERNING WILLS. In the case of
In re Estate of Stolte, 37 Ill. 2d 427, 226 N.E.2d 615 (1967), the Supreme
Court of Illinois was called upon to answer the question of whether a will
executed before marriage was either revived or retroactively changed by the
1965 amendment to section 46 of the Probate Act.' The court held that the
1965 amendment did not revive a will previously revoked by operation of
law.
The testator of the will in question, Frank G. Stolte, executed a will in
1955 and a codicil thereto in 1956. The pertinent provisions of section 46
of the Probate Act, then in effect, provided that, "marriage by the testator
shall be deemed a revocation of any existing will executed by the testator
prior to the date of marriage." 2 The testator married the respondent, Viola
Neff in 1957, at which time the provisions of the Probate Act had been
amended to read that, "unless the will expressly provides to the contrary,
(1) marriage of the testator revokes a will executed by the testator before
the date of marriage .... "1
Stolte was informed in 1958 by his attorney that his subsequent mar-
riage revoked the will, but the testator died in 1966 without re-executing
the will. In 1965, the Probate Act had been amended to provide that, "no
will or any part thereof shall be revoked by any change in circumstances,
condition, or marital status of the testator .... 4
On petition by the named executor, the will was admitted to probate
over objections of the respondent widow. The respondent then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Illinois, basing the direct appeal on the grounds that
a retroactive statute on wills would be an unconstitutional impairment of
contractual relations.
The respondent contended that a will once revoked cannot be revived
by subsequent legislation, and that the 1965 amendment was not intended to
be retroactive. In maintaining that the 1965 amendment was controlling,
the executor first argued that revocation of a will, like the will itself, is
ambulatory and dependent upon the law in force at the time the rights vest.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 46 (1965).
2 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 197 (1941).
3 The statute further provides, "No will which is in any manner revoked shall be re-
vived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof, or by an instrument in writing declaring
the revival and signed and attested in the manner prescribed in this Article for the sign-
ing and attestations of a will." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 197 (1957).
4 The statute further provides, "A will which is totally revoked in any manner shall
not be revived other than by its re-execution, or by an instrument in writing declaring
revival, and signed and attested in the manner prescribed by the Article for the signing
and attestation of the will.... This amendatory Act of 1965 applies to wills of decedents
dying after Dec. 31, 1965." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 46 (1965).
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The petitioner further maintained that the intent of the legislature was to
make the amendment retroactive.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in rejecting both of the executor's
contentions, reversed the decision of the lower court and held that the 1965
amendment did not revive a will previously revoked by operation of law. In
discussing the first contention of the petitioner, the court cited, Cyclopedia
of Law and Procedure, which states:
Where a will is revoked in toto by act of the testator, or by opera-
tion of law, it is dead for all purposes, and no difficulty in determin-
ing the operation and effect can arise.5
In answering the petitioner's second contention, concerning the intent
of the legislation, the court stated:
Even if such language [1965 amendment]6 were to show an intent
to make the amendment retroactive, it could only apply to wills
in existence .... At the time of the 1965 amendment the will was
totally revoked."
There are two theories as to the effect of a subsequent amendment
upon a will previously revoked by operation of law.8 The first theory,
adopted by a majority of the few states deciding the narrow issue, holds
that the law in force at the time of death controls. 9 This theory is based
on the premise that rights can be regulated only after they vest, and since
rights in a will vest only upon the death of the testator, the law in force at
the time of death is controlling. The second theory, and the theory ad-
vocated by the court in the present case, holds that the intent of the legisla-
ture to govern future conduct outweighs the importance of the application
of the theory of vested rights.
The Supreme Court of Illinois had previously considered several cases
involving the retroactive effect of a statute and had rejected the vested
rights theory. In In re Will of Tuller1° the court was called upon to decide
the question of whether an 1872 act which provided that a will would be
revoked upon marriage applied retroactively to an 1869 will and subsequent
marriage where the testator died in 1874. In rejecting the argument of vested
rights, the court stated:
The question is not so much whether the statute affects rights
vested before its passage, as what was the intention of the legisla-
5 40 CYC. Wills § VIII (1912).
6 The pertinent provision states, "This amendatory Act of 1965 applies to wills of
decedents dying after Dec. 31, 1965." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 46 (1965).
7 37 Ill. 2d at 434, 226 N.E.2d at 619.
8 95 C.J.S Wills § 300 (1957), 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 53 (1948).
9 Reynolds v. Love, 191 Ala. 218, 68 So. 27 (1915); In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash.
537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928); Friedman v. Cohen, 215 Ga. 859, 114 S.E.2d 24 (1960).
10 79 I11. 99 (1875).
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ture. A law is a rule of civil conduct, and the principle is, that
it is a rule for the regulation of future conduct."
The Supreme Court of Illinois again considered the impact of the
vested rights theory upon wills in Champaign County Bank and Trust Co.,
v. Jutkins.'2 In that case, the testator executed a will when divorce did not
effect a revocation. He was divorced in 1959 after a 1957 statute had been
enacted which provided for revocation upon divorce. The court held that
the law did not apply retroactively and rejected any extension of the vested
rights theory.
The court in the instant case relied heavily on In re Berger's Estate.13
In that case, the California court was presented with the issue of whether
a will could be revived by statute after having been revoked by operation of
law. The testatrix executed a will at a time when the statute provided that
a will is revoked by subsequent marriage and is not revived upon the death
of the testator's spouse. She then married and her husband died shortly
thereafter. The pertinent statute was then amended to provide for revoca-
tion only upon survival of the husband.
The California court, relying on McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, 14 held that
the will could not be revived by the subsequent statute. The court stated:
The revocation is as complete as if made by the act of the testatrix,
and the will cannot be given life and validity except by some testa-
mentary writing executed and attested in the manner prescribed by
law."5
On the strength of the above decisions, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that the will of the decedent was totally revoked and remained so
after passage of the 1965 amendment.
This decision has significant theoretical and practical impact. The
court's decision is consistent with the theory that the intent of the testator
rules. Indeed there were similar instances, as in the present case, where
testators in Illinois relied on intestate succession to provide for their
spouses upon learning of the revocation of their wills. If the court would
have followed the opposite line of reasoning, wills executed under similar
circumstances before the 1965 amendment would be susceptible to re-
vitalization.
If the vested rights theory were used, the theory of the intent of the
testator would have been distorted into an implication that the testator's in-
11 Id. at 107.
12 29 Ill. 2d 253, 193 N.E.2d 779 (1963).
13 198 Cal. 103, 243 Pac. 862 (1926).
14 20 Ill. 26, 11 N.E. 397 (1887), wherein the Supreme Court of Illinois characterized
its holding in the Tuller case by stating, "The court, after discussing at some length the
question whether the act cited should be extended to a will executed before its passage,
finally held that it did not."
15 Supra note 13, at 109, 243 Pac. at 864.
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action evidenced an intention to abide by the will. While this line of
reasoning may be sound where circumstances remain constant, it is fal-
lacious where the testator married and is aware of statutory provisions
revoking the will. The more logical assumption is that upon learning of
the revocation of the will, the testator relied on intestate succession.
The court's decision can best be considered as an advocation of the
principle that a testator acts in light of knowledge of both the law then in
effect, and the important circumstances which he foresees. Certainly, this
guarantees the certainty under which the testator believed he drafted his
will and rejects the theory that renders a will an amorphous entity sus-
ceptible to future fluctuations.
CHARLES W. STAUDENMAYER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-DISMISSAL OF TEACHER
WHO PUBLISHED LETTER CRITICAL OF SCHOOL OFFICIALS WITHIN POWER OF
SCHOOL BOARD.-In the recent case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 36
Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967), the Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted
with the issue of whether a local Board of Education must continue to
employ a teacher who published in a local newspaper misleading and un-
true statements which reflected upon the credibility and sincerity of his
superintendent and Board and which were reasonably believed to be detri-
mental to the best interests of the school. The court held that apart from
whatever freedom a private individual might possess to harm school ad-
ministrators by misuse of speech, the special position which the teacher
occupies in relation thereto dictates that he be no more privileged to injure
his school by speech than by immorality, brutality, incompetence, or other
conduct. Consequently, such behavior furnishes cause for dismissal, in the
absence of a showing that the Board acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Marvin Pickering was a teacher in Township High School District 205,
Will County. In February and December of 1961, school bond issue pro-
posals were submitted to the voters of the school district. The February
proposal was defeated; the December proposal was approved. In 1964,
proposals to increase the educational and transportation tax rates were twice
rejected. Five days after the second defeat, a local newspaper published a
letter written by Pickering to the editor of the paper. The letter consisted
of a series of complaints which its author had against the district school
superintendent and Board of Education. Pickering charged that funds pro-
cured through the referendum in December of 1961 had been used to con-
struct athletic fields and an auditorium in two local high schools although
the Board had promised that no money would be expended for such
facilities. He further alleged that school lunch prices were unnecessarily
